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ASSISTED SUICIDE, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND
"FIDELITY IN TRANSLATION"
WILLARD C. SHIH
INTRODUCTION
[T]he prospect of impossibility should not dissuade any scientist or
doctor who is sincerely dedicated to the pursuit of empirical truth.
A prerequisite for that noble aim is the ideal of unfettered experi-
mentation on human death under impeccably ethical conditions.
[Physician-assisted suicide], as I have outlined it, comes closest to
that ideal, now and for the foreseeable future. The practice should
be legitimized and implemented as soon as possible; but that calls
for the strident advocacy of influential personalities who, unfortu-
nately, choose to remain silent or disinterested-or simply
antithetical.'
Dr. Kevorkian authored this passage hoping that other physicians
would read it and join his crusade supporting physician-assisted sui-
cide. The mere mention of his name stirs up different images in peo-
ple's minds. Some call him "Dr. Death," the man who provides the
means for people to kill themselves. Others think of him as a good
doctor, aiding those who believe that life has become too burdensome
to live. But in a court of law, those who decide Dr. Kevorkian's ulti-
mate fate must lay aside whatever moral predispositions they have
towards this man or any of the many other physicians who practice
assisted suicide.2
Dr. Kevorkian's acts have attracted attention to the assisted suicide
debate and have elevated the issue to the forefront of the public fo-
rum. Three courts have recently heard arguments regarding an indi-
vidual's right to seek such help. The Michigan Supreme Court3 and a
federal district court in New York4 ruled that there is no constitutional
right to seek assisted suicide, whereas a federal district court in Wash-
ington5 found that the right exists under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.
This Note examines whether a constitutional right to seek assisted
suicide exists under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
1. Dr. Jack Kevorkian, Prescription: Medicide, The Goodness of Planned Death
244 (1991).
2. Physicians often act upon requests to hasten death. See Richard A. Knox, One
in Five Doctors Say They Assisted a Patient's Death, Survey Finds, Boston Globe, Feb.
28, 1992, at 5 ("one in five U.S. physicians say they have deliberately taken action to
cause a patient's death.").
3. People v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
4. Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
1994).
5. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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Amendment.6 Part I defines the relevant terminology in assisted sui-
cide cases and examines the most recent decisions on the issue, Quill
v. Koppell7 People v. Kevorkian8 and Compassion in Dying v. Wash-
ington.9 This part also analyzes relevant Supreme Court rulings con-
cerning the liberty interest protected in the Fourteenth Amendment'0
and distinguishes them from the assisted suicide cases. Because this
part concludes that the liberty interest does not extend to allow as-
sisted suicide, part II suggests three different models of constitutional
interpretation that a court may use to establish this right. This part
first discusses two extreme approaches of interpreting the Constitu-
tion: originalism and the theory of fundamental rights. This part then
suggests that Lawrence Lessig's intermediate method of interpretation
is a preferable approach." Lessig argues that constitutional rights ex-
ist only if the ratifiers would have protected them in the context of
present society.12 Not only does this approach take into account the
intent of those who wrote the relevant provisions of the Constitution,
but it also recognizes that legal and social changes may influence how
a judge analyzes certain issues. Part III applies Lessig's model to the
context of assisted suicide and considers whether such a right exists
independent from other privacy or due process rights. Using Lessig's
analytical framework, this part reasons that there is no constitutional
basis for the right to assisted suicide. This Note concludes that be-
cause both suicide and assisted suicide were proscribed when the ra-
tifiers adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no constitutional
right to seek assisted suicide.
6. While most of the patient plaintiffs challenging assisted suicide regulations are
terminally ill, this Note does not focus on the narrow issue of whether the terminally
ill have a right to seek help in killing themselves. Instead, this Note explores the more
general topic of whether there is a constitutional right to seek assisted suicide. Even
though the state may have a greater interest in preventing those who are not termi-
nally ill from committing suicide, this inquiry is irrelevant to this Note. The courts
must first rule whether a person, regardless of his or her condition, possesses a right to
commit suicide before considering what interests the state may have in preventing the
act from occurring.
7. No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994).
8. No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
9. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
10. If assisted suicide is a constitutional right, one place it may be located is in the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of the right to liberty.
The Supreme Court has heard several cases challenging the scope of this liberty
interest. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-08 (1992) (dis-
cussing whether a mother has a liberty interest in procuring an abortion); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (examining whether the state
could require a person to remain on life support); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(same).
11. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) (argu-
ing that when interpreting the Constitution, a court must comprehend that both the
meaning and the context of the text may have changed).
12. Id. at 1196.
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I. DEFINITIONS AND JURISPRUDENCE
Some of the controversy surrounding assisted suicide, whether the
act is legally or even morally proper, is based on confusion over what
the practice of assisted suicide entails. Therefore, before undergoing
an analysis of whether a constitutional right exists, this part clarifies
the definitions of suicide and assisted suicide and distinguishes them
from the different forms of euthanasia.
A. Relevant Terminology
There are four different ways individuals may take their lives: sui-
cide, passive euthanasia, assisted suicide and active euthanasia.
Suicide involves the voluntary termination of one's own life without
the assistance of another.13 Passive euthanasia involves a physician
who, upon the request of a terminally ill patient or his or her guardian,
removes a life support system. 4 Though suicide is a crime under com-
mon law, it is no longer punishable as a felony in most states.15 In
addition, the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health assumed that a right to passive euthanasia exists.' 6
To date, most states prohibit assisted suicide and active euthana-
sia.17 When individuals assist in a suicide, they intentionally provide
the means, such as a poison pill, for others to end their lives. In con-
trast, physicians engaging in active euthanasia take some sort of af-
firmative action that directly results in death.' 8 For example, the
doctor may inject poison to end the life of the patient, whereas in
assisted suicide, the ultimate act remains in the patient's own hands.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the constitutional implications
of assisted suicide and active euthanasia. Lower courts today are fo-
cusing on assisted suicide. For example, in People v. Kevorkian,'9 Dr.
Kevorkian challenged a Michigan statute that proscribed precisely this
13. A legal definition of suicide is "self-destruction; the deliberate termination of
one's own life." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
14. Eugenie A. Gifford, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the Art of Dying,
40 UCLA L. Rev. 1545, 1546 n.3 (1993) (defining passive euthanasia as "allowing a
patient to die by removing her from artificial life support systems such as respirators
and feeding tubes or simply discontinuing medical treatments necessary to sustain
life").
15. See infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text.
16. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1989).
17. See discussion infra part m.B.
18. See Catherine L. Bjorck, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Whose Life Is It Any-
way?, 47 SMU L. Rev. 371, 373 (1994) (defining active euthanasia as when "a physi-
cian performs the action which ends the patient's life."); Gifford, supra note 14, at
1546 n.3 (calling active euthanasia taking "positive steps to end the life of a patient,
typically by lethal injection"); Jim Persels, Forcing the Issue of Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide: Impact of the Kevorkian Case on the Euthanasia Debate, 14 J. Legal Med. 93, 94
(1993) (indicating that in active euthanasia, an individual engages in an "affirmative
action to purposefully induce death before nature can take its course").
19. No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
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course of action. 0 If the Supreme Court recognizes a right to assisted
suicide, the next battle might be fought over the legality of active
euthanasia.
B. Relevant Case Law
Only three courts have rendered decisions specifically addressing
the constitutionality of assisted suicide under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. All are on appeal.2'
1. Quill v. Koppell
In Quill v. Koppell,z z a federal district court in New York ruled that
there was no right to seek assisted suicide. 3 The original group of
plaintiffs included three physicians, one of whom was Dr. Timothy E.
Quill.24 They sought to enjoin the state from prosecuting them under
two New York statutes that criminalized assisted suicide. 5 Dr. Quill
was involved in a well-known incident in which a patient told him she
would kill herself with or without his assistance.2  Choosing the for-
mer course of action, he provided her with enough barbiturates to
cause an overdose. 7 Subsequently, Dr. Quill wrote an article in the
20. Id. at *2. The statute prohibited physicians from providing the physical means
for a patient to commit suicide. Mich. Comp. Laws § 752.1027(1) (West Supp. 1994).
Most definitions for assisted suicide similarly focus on the physician providing only
the means to death, thus leaving the patient with the final choice of whether to follow
through with the act. See Bjorck, supra note 18, at 373 (defining assisted suicide as
"when a physician provides the means and information necessary for the patient to
perform the life-ending action, such as giving a prescription for sleeping pills and in-
formation about the lethal dose"); Michael J. Roth, Note, A Failed Statute, Geoffrey
Feiger, and the Phrenetic Physician: Physician-Assisted Suicide in Michigan and a Pa-
tient-Oriented Alternative, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 1415, 1426 (1994) (noting that in assisted
suicide, a second party encourages or provides the means to suicide).
21. See Thomas Maier, A Fight to the Death; Assisted-Suicide Bans Face More
Court Tests, Newsday, Dec. 17, 1994, at All (Quill will be appealed in New York);
Jessie Mangaliman, Lawyers Battle Over Legal Suicide, Newsday, Oct. 20, 1994, at
A29 (Compassion in Dying is being appealed in Washington); Michael Betzold &
Matt Davis, Kevorkian Cases May Reopen, Prosecutor Calls Court's Finding a "Total
Victory", Detroit Free Press, Dec. 15, 1994, at 1B (Kevorkian will seek certiorari from
the Supreme Court).
22. No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994).
23. Id. at *7.
24. Id. at *1.
25. The statute provided: "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second de-
gree when ... [h]e intentionally ... aids another person to commit suicide." N.Y.
Penal Law § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987).
In addition, "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intention-
ally... aids another person to attempt suicide." N.Y. Penal Law § 120.30 (McKinney
1987).
26. Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
15, 1994).
27. Id.
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New England Journal of Medicine describing these events.38 The
other two doctors were also willing to assist in suicide.29 The assisted
suicide statutes, however, deterred them from rendering help.30 Three
patients, all of whom were mentally competent adults with terminal
illnesses, also joined the original complaint.3'
The plaintiffs framed the issue narrowly, requesting the court to
rule only that terminally ill patients have a constitutional right to en-
gage their physicians to aid them in suicide.32 Toward this end, they
sought an injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the New York stat-
utes in question.33
The court first addressed two relevant Supreme Court cases.
Although the court acknowledged that plaintiffs relied upon Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,' it only indicated that the Casey Court did not
intend its decision to lead automatically to a recognition of other fun-
damental rights.35 The court, however, considered Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health36 in more detail.37 It reasoned that the
Cruzan Court only assumed a right to passive euthanasia exists, but
stopped short of deciding that it is a constitutional right.3 Even if this
right is fundamental, the Quill court nevertheless ruled that there is a
significant legal difference between passive euthanasia and assisted su-
icide.39 Unfortunately, it did not articulate what it considered the dif-
ference to be. The court concluded that neither Casey nor Cruzan
applied to assisted suicide.'
The Quill court then proceeded to apply two other tests to deter-
mine whether the right to assisted suicide is fundamental. A right that
the Constitution does not specifically enumerate must be either: (1)
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty so that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed," or (2) "deeply rooted in
the nation's history and traditions."'" The court determined that as-
sisted suicide did not satisfy either test.42 In fact, the plaintiffs did not
28. Id. After a meeting between doctor and patient to explore all possible alterna-
tives, the patient chose to take an excessive amount of the drug and thus passed away.
Id Dr. Quill was subsequently the subject of a criminal investigation, but the grand
jury did not indict him for his actions. Id
29. Id. at *3.
30. Id.
31. Id at *1. All three have since passed away. Id.
32. Id. at *1-2.
33. Id. at *1.
34. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
35. Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 1994).
36. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
37. Quill, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800 at *6-7.
38. Id at *6.
39. Id.
40. See id
41. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)).
42. See id. at *7.
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even attempt to base their arguments on the historical treatment of
assisted suicide, a necessary requirement to satisfy both tests.43 After
tracing the history of suicide, the court indicated that states no longer
treat the act as a crime because such treatment tends to punish the
innocent family of the deceased. 44 Regarding assisted suicide, the
court stated that most states have always punished the act.45 There-
fore, the court in Quill ruled that, because legal history did not sanc-
tion any form of either suicide or assisted suicide, assisted suicide is
not a constitutional right.46
2. People v. Kevorkian
Using an approach similar to that of the New York court, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court, in People v. Kevorkian,47 also declined to find a
constitutional right to assisted suicide. This decision consolidated two
cases from the Michigan Court of Appeals.48 The more relevant lower
court case considered whether the Michigan statute prohibiting as-
sisted suicide was constitutional. 49  The plaintiffs included Teresa
Hobbins, a terminally ill patient, and Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the notori-
ous physician charged with assisting others in suicide.5" Although the
court of appeals ruled that the statute violated the Michigan constitu-
tion,5 ' in dicta, it determined that the United States Constitution does
not grant a right to assisted suicide.52 In the Michigan Supreme
Court, Dr. Kevorkian and Hobbins sought a preliminary injunction
43. Id. at *6.
44. Id. at *7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
48. Id. at *1.
49. Hobbins v. Att'y Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
The Michigan statute provided:
"(1) A person who has knowledge that another person intends to commit or
attempt to commit suicide and who intentionally does either of the following
is guilty of criminal assistance to suicide ... (a) Provides the physical means
by which the other person attempts or commits suicide. (b) Participates in a
physical act by which the other person attempts to commit suicide."
People v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *4 n.14 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994)
(quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 752.1027 (1993); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.547(127) (Calla-
ghan 1993)).
50. Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d at 489.
51. In Hobbins, the court of appeals held that the assisted suicide statute violated
the Michigan Constitution. Id. at 491. This section states that "'[n]o law shall em-
brace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.'" Id. at 489 (quoting
Mich. Const. art. 4, § 24). The court determined that the statute had two objects. Id.
at 490. The first was to create a commission to study assisted suicide and the second
was to specifically criminalize the act. Id.
52. Id. at 493. The second court of appeals case that the Michigan Supreme Court
considered, People v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), also in-
volved the physician from Michigan. People v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL
700448, at *3 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994). Before the legislature enacted the assisted sui-
cide statute, Dr. Kevorkian aided in the suicide of several patients. Kevorkian, 517
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against enforcement of the statute, arguing that it was unconstitu-
tional under both state and federal law. 3
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled against Kevorkian and Hob-
bins, reversing the court of appeals on the state constitution issue.54
After deciding that the statute was constitutional under Michigan
law,55 the court addressed the issue of whether the right to seek as-
sisted suicide exists under the United States Constitution. 6 On this
issue, the court agreed with the court of appeals and concluded that
the Constitution does not protect the right to seek assisted suicide.5 7
In its analysis, the court reasoned that for it to protect the right to
assisted suicide, the right must be fundamental.58 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that this right, like the right to passive euthanasia and the right
to procure an abortion, is protected under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a substantive liberty interest.59 The
court disagreed6° and first focused its attention on distinguishing
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health6' and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.62 It stated: "In Cruzan, the Court was able to
'assume' a protected liberty interest in the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining medical treatment because it was able to distinguish between
N.W.2d at 294. The grand jury indicted him on two counts of murder, and the court of
appeals held that he must face these charges. Id at 298.
53. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 at *2 n.14.
54. Id at *2.
55. The court of appeals suggested that had the legislature chosen a more general
title, the statute would have been constitutional. Id. at *5-6. The supreme court, how-
ever, reasoned that the lower court mistakenly focused on the title of the statute. Id.
at *6. "It cannot be said that a statute has two objects if its title specifically describes
its content, but only one if the title is general." Id The more appropriate inquiry is
into the body of the act, and the court held that the statute dealt only with assisted
suicide and no other object. Id.
The title of the statute is "AN ACT to create the Michigan commission on death
and dying, to prescribe its membership, powers and duties; to provide for the develop-
ment of legislative recommendations concerning certain issues related to death and
dying, to prohibit certain acts pertaining to the assistance of suicide; to prescribe pen-
alties; and to repeal certain parts of this act on a specific date." Hobbins v. Attorney
General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 1992 P.A. 270).
56. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 at *8-14.
57. Id at *14.
58. Id. at *8.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *10. The Michigan Court of Appeals also had declined to extend the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Hobbins v. At-
torney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 492-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that assisted
suicide is significantly different from abortion). It recognized that in Roe, the guaran-
tee of personal privacy only concerned" 'marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education.'" Id. at 492 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at
152-53). No logical connection existed between these areas and terminating one's
own life. Id The court also ascertained that it should not create rights not enumer-
ated within the Constitution, as this task belongs to the legislature. Id at 493-94 (cit-
ing Moore v. East Cleveland Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
61. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
62. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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acts that artificially sustain life and acts that artificially curtail life."'63
The court reasoned that the right to withdraw treatment is passive
inaction resulting in a natural death, whereas assisted suicide is "active
misconduct" producing an artificial deathf 4 Thus, it did not consider
Cruzan as controlling precedent.
The court also ruled that the decision in Casey did not dictate the
outcome of the case. The plaintiffs argued that the right to assisted
suicide, like the choice to terminate a pregnancy, is a deeply personal
decision.65 They also contended that Casey established a broader
view of what constitutes a fundamental right.66 The court, however,
disagreed.67 It stated that the abortion cases were "unique" and not
subject to extension into other areas." In addition, the test the
Supreme Court established in Casey "does not fall so far outside" the
traditional tests for whether a right is fundamental.69 The court, like
the New York court did in Quill v. Koppell,7° found that the right to
assisted suicide must be either "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" or "deeply rooted in the nation's history and traditions."71 It
questioned "whether the asserted right . . . arises from a rational
evolution of tradition, or whether recognition of such a right would be
a radical departure from historical precepts., 72 The court concluded
that because both the courts and the states treat assisted suicide with
disapproval, the right is not grounded in tradition." Furthermore, the
court reasoned that it should not decide the issue based on competing
moral philosophies, as this task belongs to the legislature.74
3. Compassion in Dying v. Washington
In the same year that Michigan debated assisted suicide in the state
courts, a federal district court in Washington also considered the issue.
Unlike the other cases, however, this court determined that there is a
constitutional right to assisted suicide. In Compassion in Dying v.
Washington,75 several groups banded together to challenge their
63. People v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *11 (Mich. Dec. 13,
1994).
64. Id.
65. Id. at *10.
66. Id. at *12.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *13. In Casey, the Supreme Court advocated using a "reasoned judg-
ment" standard to determine whether a right is fundamental. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
70. No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994); see supra
part I.A.1.
71. People v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *13 (Mich. Dec. 13,
1994).
72. Id.
73. Id. at *13-14.
74. Id. at *14.
75. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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state's restriction on assisted suicide.76 One of the plaintiffs was an
organization that periodically aided others in committing suicide.77
Several patients who were terminally ill and mentally competent78 and
doctors who had received requests to hasten death 79 joined the organ-
ization as plaintiffs in the suit.
The court held that the right to assisted suicide is a fundamental
right for the terminally ill found in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' This clause declares that the state may not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."'" The plaintiffs contended that the liberty interest within this
clause gave them a "right to be free from undue governmental intru-
sion on their decision to hasten death and avoid prolonged
suffering. '
The Washington court extended the reasoning of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey83 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health to arrive at this conclusion.85 As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Casey, decisions regarding deeply personal matters are usu-
ally afforded constitutional protection as liberty interests.86 The court
deduced that, similar to the abortion decision, choosing whether to
76. Id. at 1456-58. The Washington statute made assisted suicide a felony. It pro-
vided: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes
or aids another person to attempt suicide. Promoting a suicide attempt is a class C
felony." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
77. Compassion in Dying will not assist anyone in committing suicide unless sev-
eral criteria are met. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1458
(W.D. Wash. 1994). First, the primary care physician must consider the patient termi-
nally ill. Id. Another consulting physician then must examine the patient's medical
records to verify the terminal progress of the illness and to ascertain that inadequate
pain management is not a factor in the decision to commit suicide. Id. A mental
health professional also may certify that the patient is mentally competent and not
depressed or emotionally distressed. Id. Finally, the patient must request death at
least three times, either written or on videotape, with an interval of at least 48 hours
between the second and third requests. Id.
78. Id. at 1456-57. Jane Roe suffered from cancer that had metastasized through-
out her skeleton. Id. at 1456. Doctors had given her less than six months to live. Id.
John Doe was diagnosed with AIDS. Id. Since his infliction with the virus, he had
battled pneumonia, skin and sinus infections, seizures and fatigue. Id. The last pa-
tient, James Poe, was inflicted with emphysema, a disease that causes a constant suffo-
cating sensation. Id. at 1457.
79. Id. at 1457-58. In their declarations to the court, several doctors wrote that
because the statute deterred them from acting on requests to aid in suicide, their
patients often proceeded on their own. Id. In fact, two doctors described personal
experiences where their patients, after being refused a prescription for drugs, used
violent means to kill themselves. hM at 1458 n.3.
80. Id. at 1461, 1467.
81. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
82. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash.
1994).
83. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
84. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
85. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459-62.
86. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
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kill oneself "involv[es] the most intimate and personal choice[ ] a per-
son may make in a lifetime."87 According to the court, the arguments
that might distinguish abortion from assisted suicide "hardly amount
to a distinction that warrants a different constitutional result. 88 Be-
cause a personal right is involved, the court declined to leave it to the
legislature to decide the issue.8 9
The court also refused to distinguish Cruzan, arguing that there was
no relevant distinction between passive euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide. 90 Chief Judge Rothstein cited Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Cruzan, in which she noted that the Due Process Clause
must protect an individual's deeply personal decision to have life sus-
taining equipment removed.91 Because assisted suicide is also a per-
sonal decision that results in death, the court, from a constitutional
perspective, refused to recognize a difference between the two
situations.'
After determining that the liberty interest encompasses the right to
seek assisted suicide, the court then considered the state's interests in
prohibiting the act.93 These interests include preventing suicide and
protecting those who choose suicide from undue influence and
abuse. 94 The court determined that a total ban on assisted suicide did
not support these interests.95 Therefore, by strictly prohibiting the
act, the state had unconstitutionally placed an undue burden 96 on
those who attempted to exercise their Fourteenth Amendment right.97
87. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (citations omitted).
88. Id. The alleged distinctions include the level of personal autonomy tradition-
ally given to the decision, the presence of competing interests in the abortion decision,
the potential for undue influence and the difference in the level of medical knowledge
obtained in the two cases. Id. at 1460-61.
89. Id. at 1460. The court only granted those adults that are competent and termi-
nally ill the right to seek assisted suicide. Id. at 1462.
90. Id. at 1461-62.
91. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
92. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D. Wash.
1994).
93. Id. at 1464.
94. Id. at 1464-65.
95. Id. at 1465-66. The court reasoned that the state's interest in preventing sui-
cide is not absolute, as it could have no interest in prolonging the pain and suffering of
a dying person. Id. at 1464. Regarding the second state interest of preventing undue
influence, the court assumed that mentally competent people can make "knowing and
voluntary choices" to commit assisted suicide. Id. at 1465. Furthermore, the potential
for abuse in this instance is no greater than in cases of passive euthanasia, where a
surrogate might choose death for the patient. Id.
96. In the context of abortion, a regulation poses an undue burden on a person's
rights if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992).
97. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash.
1994). Furthermore, the court held that the Washington statute violated the Equal
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C. Supreme Court Cases
In Quill, Hobbins and Compassion in Dying, the courts adopted dif-
ferent approaches to substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because these decisions rely heavily on prior Supreme
Court liberty interest cases, this section examines the following deci-
sions in more detail: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,98 Roe v. Wade99 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey."° This sec-
tion then considers to what extent courts should rely upon these and
other cases. It concludes that these decisions concerning passive eu-
thanasia and abortion are not binding upon the courts when they con-
sider whether there is a constitutional basis for the right to assisted
suicide.
1. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health and the
"Right to Die"
The most relevant Supreme Court case on the question of assisted
suicide is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,'0' in
which the Court considered whether the liberty interest protected in
the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment.) 2 The plaintiff, Nancy Cruzan, was in a persistent
vegetative state and thus incompetent. 10 3 Her parents sought authori-
zation from the court to remove her artificial nutrition and hydration
equipment."° Even though the Court declined their request, it did so
not because their daughter lacked the right to refuse treatment.
Rather, her parents had failed to produce clear and convincing evi-
dence to indicate that she would have desired the procedure.105 To
reach this conclusion, the Court assumed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment granted a competent person a right to refuse lifesaving hydra-
tion and nutrition.106 The Court grounded this supposition in its prior
decisions that recognized the continued viability of the doctrine of in-
formed consent:107 "The logical corollary [of this doctrine] is that the
Protection Clause. Because the court could not find a difference between natural and
artificial death, it held that the statute burdened the fundamental rights of those not
on life support while leaving intact the rights of those on life support. Id. at 1466-67.
Those on life support, by removing their artificial hydration and nutrition equipment,
still possessed the right to commit suicide under the statute.
98. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
101. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
102. Id- at 279.
103. Id at 266.
104. Id. at 267-68.
105. Id. at 285.
106. Id. at 279.
107. Id- at 277-79; see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22 (1990) (recogniz-
ing a prisoner's interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (holding that an individual has the right to decline smallpox
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patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment.'10 8 The Supreme Court, however, has never specifically
recognized the right to die.'0 9
Some lower courts have found a right to passive euthanasia, or the
so-called "right to die," in different provisions of the Constitution. A
few have labeled it a right of privacy,"10 while others have termed it
the right to autonomy."' Several have relied exclusively on the doc-
trine of informed consent without giving the right a specific name.' 1 2
But no matter how a court arrives at finding the "right to die," the
analyses nonetheless tend to be the same." 3
In almost all of the cases concerning passive euthanasia, the courts
were careful not to extend the right to die to cover assisted suicide." 4
These decisions have routinely drawn a distinction between the with-
holding of care and assisted suicide." 5 For example, most cases care-
vaccinations). The doctrine of informed consent states that, in most cases, physicians
may not apply treatment unless they first obtain the patient's permission. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
108. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
109. Nevertheless, some commentators attempt to stretch the very specific holding
in Cruzan into a general "right to die" that encompasses all forms of euthanasia.
They have used the right to die to include everything from withdrawing useless treat-
ments to taking affirmative actions to control the time and manner of death. Robert
A. Destro, The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest: Does the Consti-
tution Encompass a Right to Define Oneself Out of Existence? An Exchange of Views
with john a. powell, Legal Director, ACLU, 10 Issues in L. & Med. 183, 200 (1994).
110. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,301 (Ct. App. 1986); Bartling
v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1984); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1990); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1987);
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976). The Supreme Court reasoned that it
could derive the right to privacy from the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and from
the language of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments of the Constitu-
tion. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
111. Those who favor the "right to autonomy" label argue that one should have the
ultimate freedom to control his or her life, including the manner in which one chooses
to die. Antonios P. Tsarouhas, Comment, The Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide, 20
Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 793, 800-01 (1994).
112. See In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (NJ. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y.
1981). The doctrine of informed consent is the common law doctrine most often in-
voked in right to die cases. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with
Assistance, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 2021, 2025 (1992).
113. In all cases, the court must decide whether the right, no matter what it is la-
beled, is fundamental and to what extent the court should protect the right in light of
opposing state interests. See Rebecca C. Morgan et al., The Issue of Personal Choice:
The Competent Incurable Patient and the Right to Commit Suicide?, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 1,
25 (1992) (arguing that the analysis would have been the same whether the right is
described as "privacy" or "liberty").
114. See, e.g., Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 71 (holding that the State's interest in prevent-
ing suicide is inapplicable if the patient desires to have a respirator removed).
115. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (Ct. App. 1984) (deter-
mining that there is no need to consider suicide when patient chooses to refuse medi-
cal treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
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fully distinguish death that occurs naturally when medical equipment
is withdrawn from death that results because of affirmative human ef-
forts.116 The difference between acts and omissions may appear in-
consequential, thus suggesting that assisted suicide does fall within the
sphere of euthanasia. The law, however, does recognize such a dis-
tinction. As one court has stated, "There is a wide difference... be-
tween causing and preventing an injury . . . . The duty to protect
against [a] wrong is ... a moral obligation only, not recognized or
enforced by law.""' 7
417, 426 n.11 (Mass. 1977) (reasoning that in a case concerning the withholding of
medical care, "[t]he [state's] interest in protecting against suicide seems to require
little if any discussion"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 n.9 (NJ. 1976) (stating that
the New Jersey statute that makes aiding suicide an offense does not apply to third
parties assisting in passive euthanasia).
Even if the legal differences seem minimal, moral arguments may distinguish as-
sisted suicide from the "right to die."
Some theorists argue that disease does not cause a suicidal tendency. Burke J.
Balch & Randall K. O'Bannon, Why We Shouldn't Legalize Assisted Suicide, Part HI:
What About the Terminally Ill? (May 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Fordham Law Review). Instead, those who choose suicide do so because of clinical
depression. According to a survey, 93-94% of those who commit suicide have mental
disorders. Burke J. Balch & Randall K. O'Bannon, Why We Shouldn't Legalize As-
sisted Suicide, Part I: Suicide and Mental Illness (May 1994) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the Fordham Law Review). The state should not allow those with a psy-
chological disorder to take their lives. Rather, proper treatment of the disease is nec-
essary. Just alleviating physical pain, however, is not enough; total care includes
treating for social and mental pain, two factors often disregarded by those who care
for the terminally ill. Burke J. Balch & Randall K. O'Bannon, Why We Shouldn't
Legalize Assisted Suicide, Part II: Pain Control (May 1994) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the Fordham Law Review).
Others fear that, should assisted suicide become legal, the terminally ill will see it as
an obligation to die because of the financial and emotional burden they place on their
families and close friends. Burke J. Balch & Randall K. O'Bannon, Why We
Shouldn't Legalize Assisted Suicide, Part III: What About the Terminally Ill? (un-
published manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
116. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637-38 (Mass.
1986) (discontinuing G-tube causes a natural death); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426
n.11 (noting that "[Tihe cause of death was from natural causes [and] the patient did
not set the death producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his own
death"); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 670 (removing a respirator causes death naturally); In
re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) (finding that a patient in a vegetative state
dies naturally when life support is removed).
117. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H. 1898). Noted scholars also
have recognized the legal distinction between acting and omitting to act:
In the determination of the existence of a duty, there runs through much of
the law a distinction between action and inaction .... [T]here arose very
early a difference, still deeply rooted in the law of negligence, between "mis-
feasance" and "nonfeasance" - that is to say, between active misconduct
working positive injury to others and passive inaction or a failure to take
steps to protect them from harm. The reason for the distinction may be said
to lie in the fact that by "misfeasance" the defendant has created a new risk
of harm to the plaintiff, while by "nonfeasance" he has at least made his
situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his
affairs.
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Some decisions have described other important differences between
passive euthanasia and assisted suicide. For instance, the right to pas-
sive euthanasia is well-grounded in the historical notion of informed
consent. 118 The Court has routinely protected patients from an unde-
sired touching by their doctors, even though this battery may have
been necessary to save their lives.' 19 Therefore, in passive euthanasia,
the doctor who leaves a patient, against his or her will, on life-sus-
taining equipment has also committed a battery.1 20 The same ration-
ale does not exist for allowing assisted suicide. The patient is not
seeking to have medical equipment withdrawn or refusing an un-
wanted touching. Instead, the patient is endeavoring to have medical
treatment applied.
Because of the historical tie between legal theories substantiating
informed consent and passive euthanasia, states traditionally did not
proscribe passive euthanasia.12 ' Likewise, because there is no logical
relation between informed consent and the request for assisted sui-
cide, this act has historically been banned. Thus, while passive eutha-
nasia and assisted suicide both result in the death of a patient, history
has treated the two very differently. No laws permitted physicians to
assist in suicide under common law, at the time of the original framing
or when the ratifiers adopted the Fourteenth Amendment.122 This is
in stark contrast with how the courts and legislatures of the time
viewed the right to refuse treatment.123
Because of these distinctions between assisted suicide and passive
euthanasia, a court cannot justifiably rely on Cruzan as controlling
precedent. The two situations, even though analogous in their ends,
deserve different legal treatment.
2. Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Right to
Choose Abortion
In addition to discussing the relevance of passive euthanasia, the
Compassion in Dying and Kevorkian courts went to great lengths to
analyze the applicability of the abortion decisions. 24 When these two
courts decided the issue, they relied on Planned Parenthood v.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 373 (5th ed.
1984) (citation omitted).
118. The right is derived from the common law notion that a touching without legaljustification is a battery. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-
70 (1990).
119. Id. at 270-77.
120. Id. at 269.
121. Id.; see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-53 to 2H-78 (West Supp. 1994) (New
Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64
(N.J. 1976) (holding that plaintiff had a right to choose death).
122. See discussion infra part III.A (detailing history of assisted suicide laws).
123. See supra notes 106 and 121.
124. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-61 (W.D.
Wash. 1994); People v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *8-13 (Mich. Dec
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Casey,125 the most recent case on abortion and the liberty interest in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Before examining Casey, however, it is
necessary first to discuss Roe v. Wade,1" the Supreme Court's prior
decision on abortion, which Casey reconsidered.
In Roe, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute that for-
bade abortion under most circumstances.lv It held that before viabil-
ity of a fetus, a woman has a fundamental right to obtain an
abortion." 8 The Court underwent an exhaustive analysis of the his-
tory of abortion, tracing attitudes toward the practice from ancient
times all the way through the current ideological positions of organi-
zations such as the American Medical Association and the American
Public Health Association. 29 In concluding its historical analysis, the
Court stated: "It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of
the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of
the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under
most American statutes currently in effect."' 3 ° In fact, restrictive
criminal abortion laws are "not of ancient or even common-law
origin. "131
The Court next recognized that the right of privacy, though not ex-
plicitly enumerated, exists within the Constitution. 32 In the past, the
Court had found this right in cases relating to marriage, 3 procrea-
tion,'3 contraception 35 and child rearing, 36 and now it extended pri-
vacy to cover abortion. 137 According to the Court in Roe, the right of
privacy is broad enough to encompass choosing to have an
abortion. 38
Despite the privacy arguments, the Supreme Court appeared to fo-
cus primarily on the history of abortion. The Court chose to spend
over fourteen pages of its decision solely to show that abortion was
13, 1994). But see Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800, at *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994).
125. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. Id. at 164.
128. Id at 163-64.
129. Id. at 129-47.
130. Id. at 140.
131. Id. at 129. At English common law, obtaining an abortion before a woman
was "quick with child" was not a criminal act. Id at 138.
132. Id. at 152.
133. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
134. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
135. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
136. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
137. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). The Court nevertheless cautioned
that an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases does not exist. Id. at 154.
In addition, the Court has extended privacy to cover acts in the home, such as
viewing pornography. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
138. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. According to the Court, if it did not grant the mother
this right, great harm would result. Id. For example, she might be exposed to physical
or psychological harm, and the unwanted baby might suffer from neglect. Id.
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not historically treated with disfavor.139 With this analysis, the Roe
opinion effectively grounded the right to choose an abortion in histori-
cal tradition."4
Under Roe's analysis, therefore, it does not necessarily follow that a
court can extend the justification for the right to choose abortion into
the area of assisted suicide.' 4 ' First, in Roe, the Court ascertained that
history did not strictly forbid the right to choose an abortion. As
pointed out previously in comparison to the right to passive euthana-
sia,'42 the history of assisted suicide is different.'43 Second, the Court
held that privacy rights only exist in certain areas such as marriage and
contraception."' Assisted suicide does not fall within these catego-
ries. Moreover, the Court went to great lengths to indicate that
choosing an abortion may not involve terminating the life of a per-
son.145 Assisted suicide, on the other hand, involves precisely the op-
posite situation, where a human being chooses to die.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington,46 the only case to find a right
to assisted suicide, interprets Roe differently. The court in Compas-
sion in Dying explained that the right to die is easier to justify than the
139. Id. at 129-43.
140. This analysis was necessary because a fundamental right must be "'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). Several scholars
have suggested that the Court analyzed historical tradition to derive a right of privacy,
rather than ruling in favor of an all-encompassing right to personal autonomy.
Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 13-17
(1985).
In a later case, Justice Scalia stated that the reason for the historical analysis in Roe
was to negate the proposition that abortion was commonly proscribed throughout
history. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). This emphasis on
history, rather than on current social attitudes, is generally necessary to base a sub-
stantive right in tradition. Id. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2805 (1992) ("It is also tempting.., to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects
only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against
government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent with our law." (citation omitted)).
141. See Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
("Judicial discovery of a right to terminate one's life is not a logical extension of...
[abortion] rights.").
142. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
143. See infra part III.A.
144. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding a right to choose to
have an abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the freedom
to marry); see generally Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (1992) (describ-
ing privacy as the control over decisions arising out of love, liking and care).
145. The Court found that a person, as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. Nevertheless, the Court did recognize
that the fetus had some rights. For example, once viability occurred, the state could
not proscribe abortion unless the mother's life was in jeopardy. Id. at 164-65. See
generally Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 21 (1993) (discussing difference between
constitutional definition of "person" and moral definition of "person").
146. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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right to choose to have an abortion.14 7 The former involves one's own
life, whereas in the latter, the interests of the unborn fetus are also at
stake.1' 8 This view of the Compassion in Dying court does not take
into consideration that in Roe the Court was not only concerned with
protecting the mother's privacy but also with preserving life in gen-
eral. The Court's preoccupation with protecting life is evident in its
proscription of abortion after the viability of the fetus except when
necessary to protect another life-the mother's.'49 On the other
hand, the Court emphasized that abortion in the first trimester does
not kill an infant, the act only ends a "potentiality of life." 150
The right to assisted suicide also cannot be justified under the more
recent abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.15 ' Although
the court in Compassion in Dying cited Casey as precedent, 52 its reli-
ance is misplaced.
The Casey Court gave two justifications for affirming the right to
choose abortion, and it is not clear which, if either, it thought was
more important. 53 One reason was grounded in stare decisis. 1 4 Ac-
cording to this analysis, the Justices could not justify overruling Roe
simply because they believed it was wrongly decided. 55 To do so
would be to compromise the Court's legitimacy, both politically and
socially.' 56 Another reason the Court affirmed Roe was that it consid-
ered the right to have an abortion as a fundamental right. 57 It held
that the Due Process Clause encompasses more rights than those that
147. Id. at 1460.
148. Id.
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
150. Id. at 162.
151. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
152. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D. Wash.
1994).
153. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807-09 (1992). If length of
analysis is any indication of which was the more important issue, the Court devoted
only five pages to the consideration of whether abortion is a liberty interest and four-
teen pages to the issue of stare decisis and whether the specific framework of Roe was
still constitutional. Id. at 2804-21.
154. The Court reasoned:
So in this case we may inquire whether Roe's central rule has been found
unworkable; whether the rule's limitation on state power could be removed
without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant dam-
age to the stability of the society governed by the rule in question; whether
the law's growth in the intervening years has left Roe's central rule a doctri-
nal anachronism discounted by society; and whether Roe's premises of fact
have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central hold-
ing somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it
addressed.
Id. at 2809.
155. Id. at 2814.
156. Id. at 2815.
157. Id. at 2807-08.
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were protected when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified; 158 the
additional rights include those that are deeply personal. 59
Attempting to justify a right to assisted suicide through Casey is
problematic, even though the decision is as "personal" as abortion.
As mentioned earlier, abortion significantly differs from assisted sui-
cide.' 60 In addition, Casey does not actually articulate a broader in-
quiry for determining whether a right is fundamental, as some scholars
have suggested. To suggest that Casey expanded fundamental rights
analysis is inconsistent with the Court's long established tests for in-
terpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.16' Those tests focus squarely
on history and tradition rather than on the independent reasoning of
the justices. 62
The conceptual differences between the right to assisted suicide and
existing fundamental rights, as earlier discussed in this section,163 are
not the only barriers to the Court recognizing a constitutional right to
assisted suicide. On a practical level, the recognition of such a right
within the Due Process Clause seems unlikely. This is due to the
Court's recent hostility toward expanding the substantive due process
right.164 In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,65 the Court stated that "'the
present construction of the Due Process Clause represents a major
158. Id. at 2805. The Court noted that it was engaging in "reasoned judgment," a
method of analysis with limitations "not susceptible of expression as a simple rule."
Id. at 2806.
159. The Court stated:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education .... These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Id. at 2807.
Thus, abortion is one of these choices "central to personal dignity and autonomy"
as well as central to the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. Id. The Court stated
that it was using a method of "reasoned judgment" to determine that abortion was a
deeply personal decision that deserved protection. Id. at 2806-07. The court in People
v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994), however, indicated
that this method does not differ from the traditional tests the Supreme Court has
applied in determining whether a certain right is fundamental. Id. at *13.
The tests that the Court has enunciated are that a fundamental right must be either
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed,'" or" 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.' " Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 141-50.
161. See supra note 159.
162. See supra note 140.
163. See supra part II.C.1. and text accompanying notes 141-50.
164. See Gifford, supra note 14, at 1577 (stating that though the Court will not
contract the right of privacy, it also will not expand it to encompass assisted suicide).
165. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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judicial gloss on [the terms of the Constitution], as well as on the an-
ticipation of the Framers.' "" The Court further expressed its unwill-
ingness to "breathe still further substantive content into the Due
Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a State or
city to promote its welfare." 167 Additionally, in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,"es the Court refused "to take a more expansive view of our au-
thority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due
Process Clause." '69
A right to assisted suicide, therefore, is not established within
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Accordingly, as the court in People v.
Kevorkian'70 recognized, "we must determine whether the asserted
right to commit suicide arises from a rational evolution of tradition, or
whether recognition of such a right would be a radical departure from
historical precepts."'1 71 Therefore, any argument supporting assisted
suicide must exist because of independent constitutional grounds.
II. CONsTrrTiONAL INTERPRETATION
To determine whether there is a fundamental right to assisted sui-
cide, a court must choose a tenable method of constitutional interpre-
tation. The case law on substantive liberties reveals that the courts
have used various methods of constitutional interpretation to ascer-
tain which rights are fundamental.'1 Even the Supreme Court has
not universally accepted one framework as the proper method.173
This part discusses the two primary analytical frameworks, originalism
and fundamental rights theory, and explores their weaknesses. This
part then focuses on Lawrence Lessig's intermediate model of consti-
tutional interpretation and suggests that it offers the most viable ana-
lytic approach to assessing assisted suicide.
166. Id. at 122 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting)) (denying visitation rights to a man not definitely the father of
a child).
167. Id.
168. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
169. Id at 194 (holding that there is no right to homosexual consensual sodomy).
"The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution." Id
170. No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
171. Id. at *13.
172. Compare Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15,1994) (ruling that a fundamental right must be historically recognized at law)
with Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-60 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (determining that a fundamental right must be personal).
173. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court looked at
the original intent of the framers and determined that because the right to consensual
sodomy did not exist at the time of the framers, it should not exist today. Id. at 192-94.
Whereas in Casey, the Court engaged in "reasoned judgment" to find a right to abor-
tion. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
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A. Originalism
Originalist theory seeks above all else to respect the intent of those
who ratified the Constitution. 74 Some have labeled this as "original
understanding"175 or the interpretation of a "constitution of detail."'' 76
Noted supporters of this theory include former Judge Robert Bork
and Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. 77
According to this method, a court should only consider the text, struc-
ture and history of the Constitution to interpret its effect.178 Those
who ratified the Constitution intended it to have a certain meaning,
and the courts should protect this meaning when the legislature passes
a statute or the executive takes an action that threatens the original
understanding of the ratifiers. 179 Thus, the judges should not search
for subjective intention; instead, they must conduct an investigation
into what the public understood the specific law to mean at the time
the text was adopted. 80
Judges who adhere to this theory review history to determine how
the ratifiers would have decided the issue at hand.' 8' Judge Bork indi-
cated that this process involves the application of three axioms.18 2
First, a court must accept that the ratifiers' definition of the constitu-
tional right in question is the proper one. 83 Second, it must conduct a
search for what the public, at the time the document was adopted,
interpreted the clause to mean.'8" This intention is manifest in secon-
dary materials such as debates at conventions or newspaper articles. 85
Implicit in this exercise is the need to ascertain how far the ratifiers
would have stretched a certain principle (in Judge Bork's terms, the
principle's "degree of generality"). 86 Finally, a court must apply the
principle in all cases before it, regardless of where current public sym-
pathies may lie.' 87
174. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law 143 (1990).
175. Id.
176. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 119.
177. Id. at 126, 141.
178. Bork, supra note 174, at 150.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 144.
181. See id. at 143-46.
182. Id. at 146-53.
183. Id. at 146-47.
184. Id. at 144. Those who purport to follow this method, however, are willing to
go beyond the text to adapt to advancing technology. They do not view this process
as being unfaithful to the text. As Bork stated about the originalist position, "[i]t is
no different to refine and evolve doctrine [to encompass changes in the legal environ-
ment], so long as one is faithful to the basic meaning of the amendment, than it is to
adapt the fourth amendment to take account of electronic means of surveillance." Id.
at 168.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 149.
187. Id. at 151.
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Originalists primarily justify their position by invoking the doctrine
of separation of powers'8s and arguing that judges are not given the
power to legislate. 8 9 Rather, originalists believe that judges are as-
signed the responsibility of interpreting what the law is, not what it
should be in their or someone else's eyes.' 9' Judge Bork noted that,
under an originalist view, "the judge has no authority to impose upon
society even a correct moral hierarchy."' 91 For example, according to
Judge Bork, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to protect Afri-
can Americans from the enforcement of discriminatory laws. 92 It was
not meant as a mandate to hand ultimate governance over to the
courts and to permit them to create law.' 93 Only by looking beyond
the text, Judge Bork claimed, have the courts found various liberty
interests that are unrelated to the amendment's original meaning, 194
for example, abortion rights.
Originalism, however, suffers from two significant shortcomings.
First, critics argue that the Constitution is a flexible framework, not a
rigid, specific document. For example, legal philosopher Ronald
Dworkin contends that the Constitution is an abstract document. 95
To support his proposition, Dworkin points out that the text does not
contain any references to legal, economic or other social science terms
that possess precise definitions. 196 Instead, the Constitution uses
words such as "freedom," "cruel" and "equal"-words that he has
called "breathtakingly abstract." 97 Thus, even originalists must
188. Id. at 153-55.
189. Id. at 183.
190. Originalists consider their technique as the only acceptable method because
the judiciary should only shoulder powers the Constitution grants it. Those who rati-
fied the Constitution viewed the judiciary as holding an apolitical role, not assuming
powers that alter the design of the American Republic. Id. at 154-55. Therefore, if a
section of the Constitution has become outdated, the proper remedy is to amend it,
not through the courts, but through procedures outlined in Article V. Id. at 143.
Otherwise, judges would have supremacy over the people, invalidating statutes and
executive actions and thereby creating something akin to a judicial oligarchy. Id. at
160.
191. Id. at 258. The originalists, as evidenced by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Cruzan, would not find a right to suicide, much less assisted suicide. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-95 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
For a fundamental right to be rooted in tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, the state must historically and traditionally protect it. Id. at 294. Scalia indi-
cated that the states have always possessed the power to prevent suicide, including
passive euthanasia. Id. at 293. He argued that at the time of the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, case law generally treated assisted suicide as a criminal of-
fense. Id at 294.
192. Bork, supra note 174, at 180.
193. Id. at 180-83.
194. Id. at 182-83.
195. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 127-28.
196. Id. at 127.
197. Id. at 128.
19951 1265
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
somehow decode these general messages.' 98 In describing this weak-
ness in the originalist theory, Dworkin suggests that the framers in-
tended to write these phrases abstractly and that there is no reason to
interpret them otherwise.' 99
Another major problem with originalism is that it is unworkable in
certain situations. For originalism or any other theory of constitu-
tional interpretation to be logical, courts must strictly apply it in all
cases, not merely whenever it appears convenient. At one point or
another, however, most originalists have abandoned their interpreta-
tive framework and embarked on some level of moral abstraction.200
For example, Dworkin points to decisions regarding racial segregation
in schools.2 1 He indicates that those who passed the Fourteenth
Amendment probably did not envision an integrated school system.202
Therefore, if originalists adhered to their theory, Brown v. Board of
Education"3 would not have overturned Plessy v. Ferguson,2 4 and
schools would still be racially "separate but equal. '20 5 The choice for
originalists is either to accept the "separate but equal" doctrine or to
concede that their theory fails in this circumstance. Once an original-
ist rejects the idea of a segregated school system and therefore
chooses against strictly interpreting the Constitution in this specific
instance, nothing prevents him or her from abandoning originalism in
other situations as well.20 6 Therefore, not only does originalism fail to
serve as a plausible method of interpretation, but all intermediate
198. Dworkin argues that one of the original framers, James Madison, did not con-
sider his own views on the Constitution important. As proof of this assertion, Dwor-
kin points to the fact that the framers burned all their notes from the constitutional
convention. Id at 136.
On the other hand, Judge Bork emphasizes that the subjective intent of the ratifiers
is indeed unimportant. Bork, supra note 174, at 144. According to Bork, however,
this is because how the public viewed the statute at that time, and not the intent of the
ratifiers, is truly consequential. Bork argues that James Madison, one of the original
framers of the Constitution, knew that his notes of the discussions at Philadelphia
were "merely evidence of what informed public men of the time thought the words of
the Constitution meant." Id Thus, to prevent courts from placing too great an em-
phasis on them, he burned his notes.
199. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 136. He reasons that "those who made the Con-
stitution had abstract intentions and more detailed convictions.... Originalism ar-
gues that judges should attend to the authors' more concrete convictions rather than
to their more abstract ideals. It offers no serious argument for that choice." Id. at 137-
38.
200. Id at 141-43.
201. Id at 140-41.
202. See id at 140 (postulating that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not believe that they had outlawed racial segregation in public schools).
203. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
204. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
205. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
206. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 141-43.
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levels of interpretation are also arbitrary and unprincipled without
some further justification. 0 7
Quill v. Koppel1' and People v. Kevorkian09 both recognized this
flaw in originalism. Both courts, with their emphasis on history,210 ob-
served the originalist method of constitutional interpretation. They
acknowledged, however, that the contemporary treatment of assisted
suicide is important.21 This line of reasoning is significant because
the legal standards regarding assisted suicide or any other issue may
have changed since the time of the ratifiers. Under originalist theory,
this is not an important factor for the judiciary to consider.212
B. Fundamental Rights
Unlike originalism, the theory of fundamental rights, sometimes
called moral abstraction, recognizes that the only constraint on consti-
tutional interpretation is that legitimate arguments be made.21 3 Ac-
cording to this view, the Constitution lays down a general scheme of
moral ideals, leaving it to judges to apply these principles to concrete
circumstances. 214 Those supporting this method, including Ronald
Dworkin, argue that because the framers wrote the text in the ab-
stract, they intended to commit the nation only to a general frame-
work of morality for judges to elaborate upon.215 Judges who adhere
to this method justify their decisions through their own principles and
integrity, not by turning to the concrete visions a framer may have had
in mind.216 These principles must be consistent only with Supreme
Court precedent and the "main structures of our constitutional ar-
rangement. '2 17 Finally, to have integrity, a judge who "adopts a prin-
ciple in one case must give full weight to it in other cases... even in
207. Ronald M. Dworkin, "Life's Dominion": An Exchange, The New Republic,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 43 (colloquy with Jeffrey Rosen).
208. No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994).
209. No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
210. Quill, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800, at *6-7; Kevorkian, No. 99591,
1994 WL 700448, at *13-14.
211. In Quill, the court weighed how the Model Penal Code treated assisted sui-
cide. Quill, No. 94 CIV-5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800, at *7. This Code was adopted in
1962. See infra note 297.
In the same vein, the Kevorkian court also considered more recent handlings of
assisted suicide and suicide, including how the Model Penal Code, "living will" stat-
utes and state legislatures have dealt with those who engage in these actions. Kevor-
kian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *13.
212. Rather, originalists believe that if the judiciary valued this factor, it would take
on a political role. Bork, supra note 174, at 154-55. To do so would compromise the
very structure of democracy. Id at 153-54.
213. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 145.
214. Dworkin labels this view as interpreting a "constitution of principle." Id. at
119.
215. Id. at 137.
216. Id. at 124.
217. Id at 146.
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apparently unrelated fields of law."'21s Generally, the theory of funda-
mental rights gives the court the power to propose its own theory of
morality, even though it may conflict with some of the ratifiers' more
concrete perceptions. 19
The strengths of moral abstraction lie in its ability to account for the
weaknesses of originalism.220 As previously stated, if a court adopts a
theory of fundamental rights, it does not need to discover a concrete
set of rules that may lie behind the abstract terminology of the Consti-
tution. It is not bound by the particular ideas of the ratifiers when
those ideas are clearly outdated.22' In addition, fundamental rights
theorists, unlike originalists, have no reason to worry about departing
from their interpretive framework. A court can always justify its deci-
sions by citing to a general moral principle that it is seeking to uphold.
Some supporters of the theory of fundamental rights concede that it
supplies the judiciary with a "frightening power" to prescribe morality
for the entire nation.'n As Judge Bork has argued, "every theory not
based on the original understanding.., requires the judge to make a
major moral decision.... There is no satisfactory explanation of why
the judge has the authority to impose his morality upon us."'2  If
judges are given this power, originalists and other critics argue that
clauses of the Constitution will lose their distinctiveness and become
muddled together 24 All phrases will begin to look like a general
mandate to act fairly?2 According to one extreme, judges will no
longer have to adhere to the specific meanings of the amendments, as
they will be free to add and subtract from the list of protected free-
doms. 6 For example, in the interest of "fairness," a court may order
218. Id.
219. Id. at 138. Applying this method to the issue of assisted suicide, it is hard to
say which position a judge who engages in moral abstraction would take. How judges
personally feel or what position public opinion favors may determine which side of
the fence the judge comes down upon. In essence, the answer lies in the position that
advocates the best moral arguments. For example, Dworkin believes that proscribing
assisted suicide altogether might damage the integrity of those who wish their death
to parallel how they lived their life. Id. at 216. On the other hand, those who fear that
the bedridden may choose assisted suicide because they feel they are too burdensome
to their loved ones, either economically or emotionally, may support prohibiting the
act. According to this view, legalizing assisted suicide would create an obligation to
die. See infra note 115; supra notes 304 and 324.
220. See supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
221. For example, the Supreme Court overruled a prior decision that approved of a
segregated school system, even though the ratifiers did not find any faults with such
an educational system. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
222. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 143.
223. Bork, supra note 174, at 251-52.
224. Jeffrey Rosen, Life's Dominion: An Exchange, The New Republic, Sept. 6,
1993, at 43 (colloquy with Ronald Dworkin).
225. Id.
226. Andrew J. Morris, The Morality and Constitutionality of Abortion and Eutha-
nasia, The Conn. Law Tribune, July 18, 1994, at 39 (arguing that in Dworkin's model,
because he discounts any intermediate level of interpretation, rights do not have to be
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the incarceration of a prisoner even though the arresting officers may
have violated one of his constitutional rights.
The assisted suicide cases addressed the theory of fundamental
rights in their discussions of Supreme Court precedent. All three de-
cisions 27 considered the passive euthanasia s and abortion cases.,
For example, the court in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 30 re-
ferring to the Supreme Court's willingness to protect personal deci-
sions, concluded that electing to commit suicide is also a choice of a
profound nature."' It engaged in what the Supreme Court has called
"reasoned judgment," 2  a method that seems to use moral
considerations.
The weakness of the fundamental rights theory, however, is also ev-
ident when the courts consider the approach in the context of assisted
suicide. As Judge Bork reasoned, the courts do not have the power to
base decisions solely on moral arguments.3 3 As a result, it is neces-
sary to find a model that limits the judiciary to its traditional role of
applying, rather than creating, the law, yet is flexible enough to ac-
commodate changing public values.
C. "Fidelity in Translation"
Lawrence Lessig's model, called "Fidelity in Translation," advocates
for an intermediate level of interpretation.3 Lessig's framework is
capable of respecting the ratifiers' intent while also adapting the law
to the present day context.
grounded); Rosen, supra note 224, at 43 (stating that in Dworkin's model, judges will
be free to ignore the constraints of the Constitution).
227. See supra part I.B.
228. The federal court in Washington could not find a significant distinction be-
tween the right assumed in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
269-72 (1990) (the withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment), and assisted suicide. See
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1461-62 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(finding that both are "profoundly personal decision[s]").
In contrast, the other two assisted suicide cases determined that Cruzan was not
controlling precedent. See Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800,
at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994) (considering only the legal disparities); People v.
Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *11 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (recognizing
both legal and moral differences).
229. The two abortion cases are Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The assisted suicide courts all consid-
ered whether the choice to have an abortion was similar to the choice to seek assisted
suicide. Compare Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 CIV.5321(TPG), 1994 WL 702800, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994) (stating it was not comparable) and People v. Kevorkian,
No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *12-13 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (same) with Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1461-62 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (stating it was
comparable).
230. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
231. See id. at 1461-62 (relying on the reasoning set forth in Casey and Cruzan).
232. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
233. See Bork, supra note 174, at 251-54.
234. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1173.
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The first step in Lessig's process, which he calls finding the "context
of [the] writing," is to determine the meaning of the relevant clause at
the time the ratifiers adopted it.235 This is essentially what the
originalists advocate as the beginning and end of constitutional inter-
pretation .3 6 For Lessig, however, the analysis does not end here be-
cause the task of a judge is not only to read the text according to its
original context, but also to adjust this meaning, if necessary, as soci-
ety changes?237 Lessig termed this next step as recognizing the "con-
text of [the] application." 3s8 This process entails asking judges to
determine how society treats the issue at the time the case is pending
before them.39
Using a process called translation, the court must then note any
changes in the context since the ratifiers' time, whether legal or non-
legal .2 1 Judges may address only those changes that would have in-
duced the framers to reword the text. 41 As Lessig himself admits, this
is a complicated matter.242 First, the court must become familiar with
the two contexts 43 to "know[ ] from where and to where the text must
be carried."'  This means that a court must understand the interrela-
tionship of ideas that give the text its meaning. 45
Second, the court must engage in finding an "equivalence in mean-
ing between the two contexts." 46 This requires it to construct in to-
day's language what the framers would have written if they were alive
today.247 In its search for "equivalence," a court must deviate as little
as possible from the original intention of the ratifiers2 48 Therefore, it
should only engage in translation if a presupposition completely
changes.249 Otherwise, the court should leave the text alone. For ex-
ample, politically motivated translations would exceed a court's con-
stitutionally granted institutional authority; the court would become
the law-making branch rather than its interpreter.25 0
235. Id. at 1183, 1263.
236. Id. at 1182-83.
237. Id. at 1183-84.
238. Id. at 1184-85, 1263.
239. See id. at 1184.
240. Id. at 1214.
241. Id. at 1263.
242. See id. at 1195.
243. See id. at 1194-95.
244. Id. at 1196.
245. Id. at 1195. Lessig explained that this process is possible when one is familiar
with the context of the text, "how that text interrelates with others near it, and the
context within which it sits-when one knows, for example, its purpose, the assump-
tions that underlie it, the scope of its reach, and theories it embraces." Id. at 1195-96.
246. Id. at 1196 (emphasis in original).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1206, 1263.
249. Id. at 1257, 1263.
250. Id.
The following are brief descriptions of how to apply Lessig's model.
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"Fidelity in Translation" is preferable to originalism and moral ab-
straction because it contains the advantages of both extremes 1 while
eliminating most of the disadvantages. In the spirit of originalism,
"Fidelity in Translation" incorporates the ratifiers' intent into the
method of interpretation. This process is faithful to the stated pur-
pose of the judiciary252 -the court's only purpose is to interpret the
law. Unlike the originalists, whom Lessig claims are "[b]lind to the
effect of context on meaning,"'253 "Fidelity in Translation" recognizes
that "meaning is a function of both text and context."2 ' 4 Therefore,
this model requires the court to uphold constitutional meaning even if
this requires deviation from the strict wording of the text.255 Original-
First, Lessig's model provides a plausible explanation of why Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In
Plessy, the plaintiff argued that the state contributed to the inferiority of the black
man with its support of segregation. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1243-44. Justice
Brown, writing for the Plessy court, ruled against the plaintiff, reasoning that the state
does not affect the social status of a black man, but rather, the stigma was self-created
and fully within the individual's power to remove. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551; Lessig,
supra note 14, at 1244. However, when Brown was decided, Chief Justice Warren
recognized that a presupposition had changed, namely that the government could
stamp a race with a badge of inferiority, and that social meaning was no longer only
self-created. Id. at 1245. Thus, he overruled Plessy.
Lessig's model also resolves the cases regarding a person's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment originally only applied
to cases where there was a physical invasion of property. Id. at 1238. Later, in Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the now famous dissent of Justice Bran-
deis translated the Fourth Amendment and argued that it also encompassed cases
such as eavesdropping where no physical invasion occurred:
Legislation... is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its
general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capa-
ble of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910)). Brandeis then applied this general principle to the case at hand. "When
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, 'the form that evil had theretofore
taken,' had been necessarily simple.... Subtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the Government [now]." Id. at 473 (quot-
ing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Thus, the Court expanded the
Fourth Amendment to cover eavesdropping and other cases where there state offi-
cials did not physically invade a person's property.
As one final example, federal courts originally did not apply the Fourth Amend-
ment to state officials who seized evidence on private property without a warrant.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Once the Supreme Court incorporated
the Fourth Amendment and applied it to the states, it became a simple task for state
courts to recognize this change in a legal presupposition and apply the same rule as
the federal courts. Lessig, supra note 11, at 1216.
251. This model "accommodate[s] vast changes between the framers' world and our
own, while respecting some of the limitations, as well as the ideals, of the original
text." Rosen, supra note 223, at 45.
252. See U.S. Const. art. II.
253. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1264.
254. Id. at 1166.
255. 1d at 1183-84, 1264.
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ists acknowledge this necessity only in conjunction with the advance
of technology. 256 They do not attempt to preserve the ratifiers' mean-
ing when change has occurred for other reasons. 7 In "Fidelity in
Translation," however, the court must ask itself whether the framers,
if writing the text today, would have written it differently; if so, the
court must apply the new standard to the situation before it.258
In addition, as proponents of fundamental rights theory argue, "Fi-
delity in Translation" also recognizes that the original application of
the text may no longer be proper.2 9 Instead, it appreciates that soci-
ety continues to evolve. Lessig's model effectively responds to Dwor-
kin's allegation that any intermediate level of constitutional
interpretation is unprincipled. 260 Dworkin claims that at a certain
point, all interpreters must engage in some level of moral abstrac-
tion.26' Once this occurs, Dworkin argues that no set of principles
exist that would keep the interpreter from engaging in moral abstrac-
tion altogether.261 "Fidelity in Translation," however, is based upon a
discrete set of rules. As previously indicated, each step involves a
mechanical application minimizing judicial discretion. Because "Fi-
delity in Translation" exploits the strengths of both originalism and
moral abstraction while ameliorating their weaknesses, it is a prefera-
ble method of constitutional interpretation. Consequently, applying
Lessig's model to assisted suicide provides a sound interpretive ap-
proach into whether such a right exists.
III. THE LIBERTY INTEREST AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
Lessig's model suggests that there is no constitutional right to as-
sisted suicide. First, in its historical context, the states generally
looked with disfavor on suicide and strictly prohibited assisted suicide
at the time of the ratifiers. Second, even though suicide is no longer a
crime, assisted suicide remains a felony in the present day. Therefore,
because this legal and other non-legal factors have not changed, the
courts must respect the intent of the ratifiers. As the interpreters of
the law, the courts accomplish this feat only through ruling that as-
sisted suicide is not a fundamental constitutional right.
A. Historical Context of Suicide and Assisted Suicide
"Fidelity in Translation" requires a judge to ascertain the context of
the writing-in this case, to examine the historical context of assisted
256. See supra note 184.
257. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1264. For examples of how other forms of change
affect meaning, see supra note 250.
258. Id. at 1196.
259. Id. at 1266.
260. Dworkin, supra note 145, at-142-43.
261. Id.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 200-07.
1272 [Vol. 63
ASSISTED SUICIDE
suicide. This part traces the social mores surrounding suicide, empha-
sizing the law at the time of the passage of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment. These time periods are especially relevant,
as the right to assisted suicide is most likely grounded in the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.26
Since ancient times, most societies have condemned suicide and,
correspondingly, assisted suicide.2 Perhaps the best testament of
this attitude is the Hypocratic oath: "If any shall ask of me a drug to
produce death I will not give it, nor will I suggest such counsel."2"
Despite this predominant belief, several cultures supported suicide
when a person suffered from intolerable pain2 6 or when he or she
found it necessary to maintain honor. 67
A dispute exists among historians as to whether the American colo-
nies observed English common law.Ym If they did, the views of Wil-
liam Blackstone, the principal source of English common law for
American lawyers, becomes important.269 He despised the act, calling
it "[s]elf murder.., the pretended heroism,... [the] real cowardice,
of the Stoic philosophers; who thus avoided ills, which they had not
the fortitude to endure.""27 In England, suicide was considered a fel-
263. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WVL 700448, at *8, 14 (Mich.
Dec. 13, 1994) (discussing whether the Due Process Clause encompasses the funda-
mental right to commit suicide).
264. From ancient Judaic times through the Age of Reason, societies have frowned
at the practice of suicide. George Rosen, History, in A Handbook for the Study of
Suicide 3, 3-29 (Seymour Perlin ed., 1975); Marzen et al., supra note 140, at 17-55.
Some cultures, including the Roman, Germanic and Celtic tribes, however, supported
those who chose suicide. Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal
Law 252-54 (1966). The ancient Celtics even believed that those who die of old age
and disease go to hell, while those who commit suicide go to heaven. Raanan Gillon,
Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Historical Perspective, in Euthanasia and the Right
to Death 182 (A.B. Downing ed., 1969).
265. Tsarouhas, supra note 111, at 795 (citation omitted).
A contemporary version of the Hypocratic Oath exists that seems to suggest a
change in attitude towards suicide among some members of the medical profession.
It states, "I tread with care in matters of life and death.... But it may also be within
my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great humble-
ness and awareness of my own frailty." Roth, supra note 20, at 1454 (citation
omitted).
266. Patricia A. Unz, Euthanasia: A Constitutionally Protected Peacefid Death, 37
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 439, 441 (1992) (discussing Plato's and Aristotle's support for
those who decided to commit suicide to avoid pain and suffering).
267. The ancient Jews did not look at suicide with disfavor if committed to avoid
enemy capture. Rosen, supra note 264, at 4-5. The Greeks and Romans also sup-
ported suicide when necessary to maintain one's honor and to avoid capture, humilia-
tion or death in conflicts. Id. at 5.
268. Marzen et al., supra note 140, at 63-64.
269. Id. at 62.
270. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 648 (1897).
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ony2 7 1 and punishable by forfeiture of property272 and a dishonorable
and ignominious burial.2 73 As evidence that the colonies did follow
English common law, in Massachusetts in 1660, a person who commit-
ted suicide was buried along a common highway with stones laid upon
his or her grave as a brand of infamy. 74 Some time later, however, as
the English would also do, the courts began to reject the common law
penalties for suicide because they punished innocent families. 275
Even though the legal attitudes towards suicide are well-docu-
mented, very little early case law on assisted suicide is available.276 A
court may assume, however, that if the state punished suicide as a
felony, those who aided in this act were also committing a crime. To
support this assertion, a court could cite either Blackstone or later
rulings as evidence of the prevailing attitude. Both sources support
the conclusion that assisted suicide was considered criminal. As previ-
ously mentioned, not only did Blackstone view suicide as a felony,2 "
he also described those who assist in suicide as guilty of murder.278
The later holdings of some courts also support this proposition. In
Connecticut279 and New York, °0 for example, a person who advised
another to kill himself or herself was guilty of murder. Maryland,
Massachusetts and North and South Carolina also considered assisted
suicide criminal.281 Thus, at least six out of the original thirteen colo-
nies prohibited assisted suicide.'
By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, most
states had either statutes or case law indicating that they prohibited
271. Donald W. Cox, Hemlock's Cup: The Struggle for Death with Dignity 62
(1993); Morgan et al., supra note 113, at 8; Tsarouhas, supra note 111, at 795.
272. Morgan et al., supra note 113, at 8 (discussing English law distinction between
those who committed suicide to avoid pain, in which case only movable goods were
forfeited, and those who feared punishment, in which case all goods were forfeited).
The courts waived this punishment in the eighteenth century as long as one did not
commit suicide to avoid a felony charge. The Forfeiture Act of 1870 cemented this
tendency towards leniency. Williams, supra note 264, at 262.
273. Tsarouhas, supra note 111, at 795. These penalties were repealed in 1823. Wil-
liams, supra note 264, at 260-61.
274. Williams, supra note 264, at 260-61.
275. Marzen et al., supra note 140, at 69.
276. Id. at 71. Contra Cox, supra note 271, at 62 (noting that a majority of the 13
colonies had case law indicating that assisting in suicide was a crime).
277. See supra text accompanying note 270.
278. Blackstone, supra note 270, at 648.
279. See Marzen et al., supra note 140, at 73 (citing 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws
of the State of Connecticut 270 (2d ed. 1823)).
280. 1 John Colby, Practical Treatise Upon the Criminal Law and Practice of the
State of New York 612 (1868).
281. See Marzen et al., supra note 140, at 73.
282. Id.
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assisted suicide.' Of the remaining states, only a few clearly permit-
ted the act.2 4
Thus, in defining the context of the writing of suicide and assisted
suicide, a judge may conclude that the predominant view towards sui-
cide and assisted suicide at the time of the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment was that it was a crime, even though the public
may not have viewed individual suicide to avoid pain or humiliation as
morally wrong.
B. Present-Day Context of Suicide and Assisted Suicide
The next step in Lessig's model is to interpret the context of the
currently desired application. For assisted suicide, this includes deter-
mining how both law and society treat the act today.
At first glance, it appears as if the context of the application may
have changed since the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, because
states no longer consider suicide a felony.' But just because suicide
is not a crime, it does not necessarily follow that the states see nothing
harmful about committing the act. Rather, the primary reason for the
repeal of suicide statutes was that states viewed it as futile to punish
those who kill themselves, because time in jail would not deter an-
other future attempt.2 Indeed, the threat of punishment most likely
strengthened a person's resolve to succeed the first time around.W
According to a California court, "it is clear that the intrusion of the
criminal law into such tragedies is an abuse. There is a certain moral
extravagance in imposing criminal punishment on a person who has
sought his own self-destruction .... Is States therefore view criminal
laws against suicide attempts as useless cruelty and an immense obsta-
cle to the possibility of treatment. 9 Thus, suicide is currently seen as
a sign of despondency or other mental disorder, not as a crime where
criminal penalties are the solution.2 °
283. Of the 37 states that existed when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, 21
(including the 18 that ratified the amendment) had case law or statutes designating
assisted suicide as a crime. See id. at 75.
284. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska and Texas, which voted to
ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, and Ohio, which voted not to ratify it, were the
only states that had no case law or statutes prohibiting assisted suicide. Id.
285. Tsarouhas, supra note 111, at 795 (citing Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott,
Handbook on Criminal Law § 74, at 568-69 (1972)).
286. The court in In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176 (Cal. 1983), stated: "It seems
preposterous to argue that the visitation of criminal sanctions upon one who fails in
the effort is likely to inhibit persons from undertaking a serious attempt to take their
own lives." Ia- at 1178 (citations omitted).
287. See Williams, supra note 264, at 305.
288. In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1178 (citations omitted).
289. Wfilliams, supra note 264, at 305.
290. See Marzen et al., supra note 140, at 99. "That suicide itself has been
decriminalized ... demonstrates only that pity has replaced retribution as a socially
proper response to suicide and that a punitive model was replaced by a therapeutic
one in the law. Suicide is still a harm to be avoided, not a right to be encouraged."
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The law, however, still seeks to deter suicide. For example, at-
tempts are routinely treated in mental hospitals.29 1 In addition, Jus-
tice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,"g indicated that others may use force to pre-
vent a person from committing suicide. "The state-run hospital.., is
not liable.., if, in a State where suicide is unlawful, it pumps out the
stomach of a person who has intentionally taken an overdose of barbi-
turates, despite that person's wishes to the contrary. ' 293
Because states no longer treat suicide as a felony, its context of ap-
plication may have changed. The effect of this on the lawfulness of
assisted suicide, however, is not discernible without delving into as-
sisted suicide in particular. Most states still have a law against aiding
or abetting another to commit suicide, with some treating such an ac-
tion as murder or manslaughter 94 and others treating it as an in-
Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle". Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for
the Terminally Ii, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 799, 804 (1994). A therapeutic model re-
placed the punitive model.
291. As a court in California has noted, " 'The current psychiatric view is that at-
tempted suicide is a symptom of mental illness.'" In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1179
(quoting Note, The Punishment of Suicide-A Need for Change, 14 Vill. L. Rev. 463,
465 (1969)). The same holds true in New Jersey. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-26.3a (West
1981) (calling for temporary hospitalization).
In Pennsylvania, a judge wrote that suicide "may be a sin, but it is not a crime; it is
the result of disease. [A person who attempts suicide] should be taken to a hospital
and not sent to a prison." Marzen et al., supra note 140, at 99 (citing Commonwealth
v. Wright, 11 Pa. D. 144, 146 (1902)).
Several states have statutes providing for the hospitalization of those who attempt
suicide. For example, in Florida, "[a] person may be taken to a receiving facility for
involuntary examinations if there is reason to believe that he is mentally ill and be-
cause of his mental illness. .. [t]here is a substantial likelihood that without care or
treatment he will cause serious bodily harm to himself." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.463(1)
(West 1993). A person may be involuntarily placed for treatment if "[h]e is mentally
ill... [and t]here is substantial likelihood that in the near future he will inflict serious
bodily harm on himself or another person." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.467(1) (West 1993).
In Missouri, the state can take into custody and put in a mental health facility any-
one who is a threat to harm himself. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 632.300 (Vernon 1988).
292. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
293. Id. at 298 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has also indicated that the
state and even private citizens may use force to interfere with bodily integrity to pre-
vent a felony. Id. This rule applies to suicide, because under the common law, it was
considered a felony. Id.
294. Alaska Stat. § 11.41.100(a)(1)(B) (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1103(3)
(1989); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-
104(1)(b) (West 1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1994); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 707-702(1)(b) (1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.023.1(2)(1992); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 2505(a) (1991).
Several cases exist that apply these statutes. In one case, a prisoner had helped a
fellow convict, who had talked about committing suicide for some time, kill himself.
The court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for first degree murder. State
v. Fuller, 278 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Neb. 1979). In another case, a husband killed his wife
after she repeatedly requested aid in dying. The court upheld a conviction of first
degree murder. Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1191 (Fla. 1986). As a final example,
a husband who placed a mixture of poison within reach of his wife, upon her request,
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dependent crime.295 In 1993, thirty-two states had criminalized
assisted suicide.2 96 The Model Penal Code also currently regards as-
sisted suicide as a felony.297 Furthermore, euthanasia is not available
as a defense for a person who assists a suicide.2 98 Only rarely, how-
ever, are any of these so-called "mercy killers" sentenced to time in
jail.299
The lack of prosecutions3°° may reflect changing social views of as-
sisted suicide. Thus there may be few prosecutions because the juries
believe that those who assisted in a suicide did not act immorally.3 01
Therefore, in the abstract, the act is considered wrong, but in concrete
situations, assisting a suicide may appear to be the proper action to
take. The way the juries have interpreted it, assisted suicide laws seek
was also guilty of first degree murder. People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 692-93 (Mich.
1920).
295. Cal. Penal Code § 401 (West 1993); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 645 (1994); Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-42-1-2 (Burns 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3406 (1992); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17-A, § 204.1 (West 1993); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.215(1) (\Vest 1994); Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-49 (1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-105(1) (1993); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 630:4(I) (1994); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-6 (Vest 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-
4 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. Penal Law § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); N.D. Cent.
Code § 12.1-16-04 (1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 813 (West 1983); 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 2505(B) (1993); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-16-37 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.12 (Vest 1982).
296. Jennifer L. Hoehne, Note, Physician Responsibility and the Right to "Death
Care": The Call for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 42 Drake L Rev. 225, 238-39 (1993).
297. The Model Penal Code provides: "(2) Aiding or Soliciting Suicide as an In-
dependent Offense. A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide
is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an
attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor." Model Penal Code § 210.5
(1962).
298. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(concluding that euthanasia is not a defense to murder).
299. One of the rare examples is Gilbert. Id. In Gilbert, a husband received the
minimum sentence of 25 years in prison for shooting his wife who was suffering from
Alzheimer's and osteoporosis. Id. at 1187; see also Hoehne, supra note 296, at 246-47
(commenting on the Gilbert case). The governor, however, citing Gilbert's poor
health as the reason, released him after he had served only five years of his sentence.
Id at 247.
Another case of lenient sentencing for a mercy killer was People v. Edwards, CR
7853 (Cal. Crim. Sup. Ct., Napa County 1991) (cited in Hoehne, supra note 296, at
247). In that case, the defendant suffocated his wife, who was paralyzed with a stroke
and unable to care for herself, and was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Hoehne, supra note 296, at 247-48. He served only three years of probation and com-
munity service. Id. at 248.
300. A total of 11 doctors have been charged with killing their terminally ill pa-
tients, yet not one has been incarcerated. Cox, supra note 271, at 234-37; Tsarouhas,
supra note 111, at 798-99. Even in the case of Dr. Kevorkian, the courts have dis-
missed all but one charge, and that charge is still pending in the courts. People v.
Kevorkian, No. 99591, 1994 WL 700448, at *1-2 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
301. Even if these physicians did the "right thing," it is up to the legislatures and
not the courts to repeal laws that seem morally incorrect. See supra parts II.A. and
lI.C.
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to deter the act from occurring and not to punish the actors after the
fact.30
While assisted suicide remains against the law, popular opinion is
somewhat more sympathetic toward those who engage in this action.
Recent polls indicate that a majority of people support physician-as-
sisted suicide and the idea that, at times, choosing death is honora-
ble. 3  Despite these polls, voters in both Washington and California
have defeated initiatives seeking to legalize the act.3°
302. Nevertheless, it is better to have the law on the books and ignore it than to
have no law at all. David N. O'Steen & Burke J. Balch, Why We Shouldn't Legalize
Assisting Suicide, Part IV: The Need for Civil Remedies to Prevent Assisting Suicide
(May 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review). In this
way, at least the prosecutor has the discretion to bring a charge in cases that appear
suspicious.
On the other hand, perhaps criminal penalties are not the proper response to juries
who refuse to punish physicians with a harsh penalty of jail time. At least two authors
have indicated that a civil cause of action is preferable. Id. These authors have pro-
posed giving private individuals standing to sue a doctor even if they had previously
consented to the suicide. Id. Possible remedies for such a suit could include either an
injunction or civil damages, with both likely to deter physicians from performing the
action. Id.
303. See Henry R. Glick, The Right to Die: Policy Innovation and Its Conse-
quences 84 (1992) (showing increasing support for active euthanasia, from 37% in
1947 to 69% in 1990); Julia Pugliese, Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 Hastings L.J. 1291, 1318 (1993) (indicating that in the
1990 Roper Poll, 64% answered affirmatively, compared to 24% supporting the other
side, to the question, "When a person has a painful and distressing terminal disease,
do you think doctors should or should not be allowed by law to end the patient's life if
there is no hope of recovery and the patient requests it?" (quoting The Roper Organi-
zation, Roper Report 90-5, in Hemlock Q., July 1990, at 5)); Across the USA: News
From Every State, USA Today, July 12, 1994, at 8A (stating that 52% approved of
doctor-assisted suicide while 31% disapproved in a Detroit News poll); Peter Steinfels,
Beliefs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1991, at 11A (noting that 64% support assisted suicide in
a Boston Globe poll); Evan Moore, Taking Life in Their Hands; Should We Be Free to
Choose Suicide-and to Ask for Help?, Hous. Chron., Oct. 2, 1994, at 1A (finding that
53% believe that assisted suicide is an acceptable act in a New England Journal of
Medicine poll).
304. In November of 1991, Initiative 119 of Washington state read: "Shall adult
patients who are in a medically terminal condition be permitted to request and re-
ceive from a physician aid-in-dying?" Bjorck, supra note 18, at 384 (quoting William
McCord, Dignity, Choice and Care, Society, July/Aug. 1992, at 20). The proposed bill
required two physicians to certify that the patient was mentally competent and termi-
nally ill, had less than six months to live and had executed a medical directive request-
ing assisted suicide in the presence of two unrelated witnesses. Persels, supra note 18,
at 103. To get the initiative on the ballot, 223,000 signatures were collected, 70,000
more than required. Id. Even so, the initiative failed 54% to 46%. Id. Voters inter-
viewed on the way to and leaving from the polls said they were concerned about who
would be considered terminally ill and that the elderly might choose suicide to spare
their families and friends from economic and emotional hardship. Id. at 103-04.
In 1992, Proposition 161, commonly known as the California Death with Dignity
Act, contained provisions that called for (1) two physicians to certify the patient as
terminally ill, (2) the patient to be certified as mentally competent, (3) the patient to
have executed a revocable, written statement in the presence of two disinterested
witnesses, (4) the patient to have made the request more than once and (5) a licensed
physician to perform the procedure. Mary M. Penrose, Comment, Assisted Suicide:
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In November, 1994, however, an initiative finally passed in Ore-
gon.30 5 The scenario leading up to election day appeared no different
A Tough Pill to Swallow, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 689,712 (1993). For a complete copy of the
propsal, see Cox, supra note 271, at 263. Proposition 161 also lost 54% to 46%, even
though more than 4.5 million citizens voted in favor of it. Bjorck, supra note 18, at
384. When asked, doctors said they voted against the bill because it lacked safeguards
to protect the poor, depressed, those suffering pain, the mentally incompetent and
seniors. Id. Others were also concerned that the initiative did not specify the type of
doctor permitted to perform the act, and that it did not require a waiting period.
Penrose, supra, at 713.
Supporters of these two measures have given various explanations for each defeat.
Some have blamed it on the use of rhetoric. Derek Humphry of the Hemlock Society
said at the time, "'Aid-in-dying'-as the campaigners called it--can mean anything
from a physician's lethal injection all the way to holding hands with the dying patient
and saying 'I love you.' [The campaigners] avoided the words 'sucide' and 'euthana-
sia' as though they were obscenities." Cox, supra note 271, at 168 (quotingy Derek
Humphry, Why Were They Beaten in Washington?, Hemlock Q., Jan. 1992, at 4).
Not all agree with Humphry on this matter.
If you doubt that word games are becoming crucial to our social and political
struggles, listen to Derek Humphry. A leading figure in the euthanasia
movement, Humphry says his side lost at the polls in Washington state last
fall largely because it lost the battle over language... In passing, Humphry
pointed out the vagueness of "aid in dying." It can mean, he says, "anything
from a physician's lethal injection all the way to holding hands with a dying
patient and saying, 'I love you.'" Anyone who stretches a phrase to cover
both killing and moral support is a serious player in the language games.
John Leo, Stop the Murdering Language!, U.S. News & World Report, April 12, 1993,
at 23.
Humphry also blamed the lack of adequate safeguards for the failure in Washing-
ton, arguing that the campaigners made the mistake of painting the law with a "broad
brush," intending to hammer out the details only after the voters approved the act.
Cox, supra note 271, at 168 (quoting Derek Humphry, Why Were They Beaten in
Washington? Hemlock Q., Jan. 1992, at 4). For example, in California, there was no
need for witnesses to the oral request. Furthermore, no "cooling-off" period was nec-
essary between the time the patient made the request and when the physician carried
it out. Bjorck, supra note 18, at 385 (quoting James W. Walters, Perspective on Prop.
161; Aid in Dying is Human, Humane; Assisted Suicide for the Terminally Ill Doesn't
Conflict with Medical or Religious Interests; It Does Respect Individual Rights, LA.
Times, Oct. 18, 1992, at M5.
Disproportionate campaign funding may also have caused the initiative to fail.
Those opposing the act raised 2.8 million dollars compared to only $215,000 support-
ers collected. Id. The L.A. County Medical Association, the California Association
of Catholic Hospitals, the Los Angeles County Medical Associaiton, the California
Nurses Association and the Catholic Church all fought against the statute. Hoehne,
supra note 296, at 241; Penrose, supra, at 711.
In addition, those who wrote the initiatives may have worded them vaguely. For
example, the California version did not indicate whether patients must necessarily
exhaust all forms of treatment before a physician can certify them as terminal. Pug-
liese, supra note 303, at 1321.
Those who supported the act cited further reasons for its failure, including negative
publicity arising out of Dr. Kevorkian's activities and the lack of a residency require-
ment for physicians who wished to practice assisted suicide. Penrose, supra at 710.
305. Voters in Oregon Allow Doctors to Help the Terminally Ill Die, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 1994, at A28.
The Oregon act is entitled Measure 16, the Death with Dignity Act, and got 95,777
signatures of 66,771 required to put the initiative on the ballot. Evan More, Taking
Life in Their Hands; Should We Be Free to Choose Suicid-and to Ask for Help?,
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than that of the prior two similar initiatives that failed. Once again, a
strong coalition emerged that opposed legalizing assisted suicide, a co-
alition that included the American Medical Association and various
church organizations.3 °6 This coalition outspent the proponents ten to
one in advertising campaigns and other publicity events.307 Neverthe-
less, the Death with Dignity Act passed by a vote of fifty-two percent
to forty-eight percent. 30 8 Even though U.S. District Judge Michael
Hogan blocked Orgeon from implementing the law until the court has
ruled on the issue,30 9 the fact that the people passed the initiative
demonstrates broad public support for assisted suicide.
Other states recently have considered (or are currently debating)
the issue. In New York, for example, a task force rejected the idea of
legalizing euthanasia.310 In addition, in 1992, the state legislatures of
Iowa, Maine, Michigan and New Hampshire considered bills legaliz-
ing assisted suicide, yet these states did not pass any of these bills.311
Various state legislatures are currently discussing the issue, including
those in Connecticut and Virginia.312 In addition, California, New,
Hampshire and Washington are reconsidering measures. 313
Currently, however, most state legislatures retain statutes prohibit-
ing assisted suicide. While this is the status of the law at the present
time, as each year passes, more and more legislatures will consider
whether or not to legalize the act. But as it stands, those who seek
such assistance may find that many physicians are unwilling to provide
it. In sum, the overall context of assisted suicide has not changed be-
tween the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
current application in society.
C. No Change in Context
After ascertaining both the context of the writing and of the appli-
cation, the final step in "Fidelity in Translation" is a process Lessig
Hous. Chron., Oct. 2, 1994, at Al. It contains other safeguards such as only those
older than 18 with a terminal illness could make requests, a patient must make two
requests to the same physician, wait at least 15 days and be counseled about alterna-
tives, pass a competency assessment, and have a second physician confirm the illness.
Art Caplan, Death Be Not Allowed: Resist Assisted Suicide, Hous. Chron., Oct. 1,
1994, at Religion 3.
306. Measure on Suicide Fought by Churches, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1994, at B4.
307. Ellen Goodman, Death on the Ballot, Boston Globe, Nov. 3, 1994, at 19.
308. Voters in Oregon Allow Doctors to Help the Terminally Ill Die, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 1994, at A28.
309. U.S. Judge Keeps Oregon's New Suicide Law in Limbo, L.A. Times, December
28, 1994, at A5.
310. One reason the legislature rejected legalizing euthanasia was because it feared
the right would become a duty to act. Bob Keeler, Assisted Suicide Rejected; State
Panel Cites Dangers, Newsday, May 26, 1994, at 3.
311. Pugliese, supra note 303, at 1319.
312. Bjorck, supra note 18, at 386.
313. Id. at 386; States Wrangle with Death Wishes, USA Today, May 23, 1994, at 8A.
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calls "translation." '314 Where there has been no change in either a
legal or a non-legal factor, a court is required to uphold the original
intent of the ratifiers.315
As previously discussed, the contexts of suicide and assisted suicide
have not changed.316 In addition, "translation" is not needed because
the Supreme Court has not expanded the categories of what consti-
tutes a fundamental right.3 17 Whenever a court engages in substantive
liberty analysis, it considers the historical basis for the right in ques-
tion. This was true in cases such as Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health,318 Bowers v. Hardwick319 and Roe v. Wade.320
Therefore, translation is not required because the legal treatment of
assisted suicide has not changed and the constitutional principles that
apply to the act are not expanding.
Because the legal factors have remained constant, the only reason
for a court to engage in translation is if non-legal factors suggest a
need for change. It is important to remember, however, that the court
only should translate those changes that are not "political."3 2 '
The most important non-legal consideration is that advances in
medical treatment can keep a patient alive for longer periods of time
than in the past, thus prolonging the painful experience of terminal
illness.322 On the other hand, pain killers have become increasingly
sophisticated. 3 1 Whether these differences are actually beneficial to
the patient is unclear.324 The answer to this question, however, is
based on moral considerations. "Fidelity in Translation," on the other
hand, requires the courts to avoid making a determination based on
these non-legal, "political" elements, because the translator's job is
not to make the text better.3  Moral arguments that may favor modi-
314. Lessig, supra note 11, at 1189.
315. See supra part II.C.
316. See supra parts 1I.A. and m.C.
317. For a discussion of two other legal factors, see parts HI.A. and III.B. (describ-
ing assisted suicide and suicide).
318. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
319. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
320. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
321. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1254. "Political" changes are those changes that
the legislature should correct, those changes which the original ratifiers themselves
would have battled over. Id
322. Robert L. Risley, Ethical and Legal Issues in the Individual's Right to Die, 20
Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 597, 606 (1994) (noting that the modem medicine can keep the
body alive now even when the brain has died).
323. Some would argue that medical technology improves the prospects of patients,
giving them more time to heal. On the other hand, patients attached to life sustaining
equipment may believe they have no chance at all of living a meaningful life and
would therefore rather die with dignity.
324. But legalizing assisted suicide could create an obligation to die. The law
should not require that people choose death. Because of this possibility, a court
should not consider this factor as changing a non-legal presupposition. See supra notes
115, 219 and 304.
325. Lessig, supra note 11, at 1253.
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fying the laws are for the people to make through their elected repre-
sentatives in the state legislatures. Laws that support assisted suicide
are examples of this type of change for the "better"-a change the
judiciary should not make. According to "Fidelity in Translation," the
courts should respect the separation of powers doctrine and leave it to
the legislatures to pass laws that either permit or prohibit assisted sui-
cide. Therefore, even the non-legal factors do not mandate translating
the Constitution to create a right to assisted suicide.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the thoughts of Dr. Kevorkian,326 his fight in the
courts will likely prove unfruitful. A court choosing to interpret the
Constitution according to Lawrence Lessig's "Fidelity in Translation"
would find that Kevorkian's patients have no constitutional right to
seek assisted suicide. Therefore, to respect the intent of the ratifiers,
the judiciary should not invalidate any laws relating to assisted suicide,
no matter how persuasive the moral arguments favoring invalidation
appear. If the arguments supporting the act are so overwhelming,
state legislatures will recognize this fact and pass laws that permit as-
sisted suicide. It is here that the advocates of assisted suicide should
focus their efforts. Until the time, however, when assisted suicide sup-
porters are able to convince the people that their argument better
serves justice, the courts do not possess the authority to find a consti-
tutional right to engage in assisted suicide in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
326. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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